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 1. Introduction  
 
Law is a practical institution the primary business of which is to guide – mainly 
through rules and commands – the behavior of citizens and officials.  Given that the 
law guides behavior, the law appears normative.  That is, the law appears to provide 
reasons for actions.  For example, judges take the law as a reason to settle a dispute in 
one way rather than another; and citizens take the law as a reason to act as the law 
requires.  Accordingly, an issue that has attracted significant attention in legal 
philosophy has been explaining the nature of legal normativity.    
 
Legal normativity is particularly puzzling for those who think about law from within a 
positivistic framework, which is the dominant approach in 20th century and 
contemporary legal philosophy.  Briefly, positivists hold the view that law is 
something that is posited.  Law, in other words, is made by people and institutions 
and is, therefore, a human artifact, a feature of individual and social behavior and 
psychology.  Given that law is grounded in facts, the puzzle has been to explain the 
apparent normative nature of law.  Simply put, how can social, behavioral and 
psychological facts give rise to norms?  And if so, what sort of norms are these?  
 
In her rich, insightful and novel book Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco offers a fresh and 
innovative perspective, deploying insights from action theory and the philosophy of 
practical reasoning to shed new light on the puzzles of law’s normativity.  Rodriguez-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
∗"Hebrew"University"of"Jerusalem"&"King’s"College"London.""
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Blanco’s contention is that legal philosophy has been dominated by an impoverished 
conception of practical reasoning and intentional action.  And, given that the law is 
first and foremost a practical institution regulating actions, this impoverishment has 
lead to impoverished accounts of the nature of legal normativity.  Armed with what 
she takes to be a richer and better conception of how people reason when they act 
intentionally, Rodriguez-Blanco sets out to evaluate, amend and challenge the 
answers given to the puzzles of legal normativity by the key figures of 20th century 
legal philosophy, as well as to offer her own answers.  In addition to legal philosophy, 
Rodriguez-Blanco also contributes to the literature on the doctrine of the guise of the 
good and action theory, as well as delves into meta-ethics and moral psychology.  
This innovative monograph should greatly interest anyone working in general legal 
philosophy.     
 
 2. Intentional actions under the guise of the good 
 
Rodriguez-Blanco rejects a conception of intentional action based on a paradigm 
involving a mental state – such as a desire – and an act resulting from that mental 
state.  According to Rodriguez-Blanco, this common picture of the structure of 
intentional actions is incomplete, because it supposedly cannot explain why 
intentional actors – from their own point of view as rational agents – are doing what 
they are doing.  Given that people are rational agents and given that in acting 
intentionally people act as rational agents, it follows that we must have some rational 
point or end for our action, some grounding reason that makes our intentional actions 
intelligible as actions of rational agents.  Accordingly, a theory of intentional action 
must incorporate this process of rational reasoning underlying intentional action.  
That is, it must account for one’s own reasons for acting.  The aforementioned 
conception of intentional action has a hard time providing such an explanation 
because it focuses only on the voluntariness of intentional actions and has nothing to 
say about one’s reasons for one’s actions.  
 
The view that intentional actions involve a kind of reasoning through which one 
necessarily grounds one’s actions in a rational end, value or good-making reason has 
come to be known as the ‘doctrine of the guise of the good’ (hereinafter ‘GoG’), a 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2779285 
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view that has its origins in ancient Greece and is very much alive and well in 
contemporary philosophy.  Most of all, Rodriguez-Blanco relies on the work of 
Elizabeth Anscombe (Anscombe, 1963), such as adopting her method for unearthing 
the rational underpinning of intentional actions by asking actors to explain why they 
do what they do.  This line of questioning is designed to produce a chain of actions 
and reasons for those actions, each reason grounding the one that came before it until 
one reaches an end, value or good-making reason that rationally grounds the whole 
chain, making it intelligible as a single intentional action.  Without such a grounding 
end or value we cannot, according to Rodriguez-Blanco, characterize behavior as 
intentional action, because a rational agent’s intentional conduct is inherently 
grounded in reason.    
 
Rodriguez-Blanco gives the example of the action of putting on a kettle (pp. 27-28).  
To account for this activity as an intentional action of a rational agent we must go, 
according to Rodriguez-Blanco, beyond merely describing the physical motion of 
lifting a kettle and putting it on the stove and the mental states of willing the lifting of 
one’s arm and performing that motion.  To fully understand this activity and to make 
sense of it as an intentional action we must explore further, pursuing a line of 
questions and answers designed to unearth the actor’s point or end for the activity:   
 
• Q: why are you putting on the kettle?   
• A: to heat the water;  
• Q: why do you wish to heat the water?  
• A: to make tea with it;  
• Q: why do you wish to make tea?  
• A: because of tea’s restorative virtues.   
 
It is only once the chain of explanations for the action reaches the end of tea’s 
restorative virtues that we have a full understanding of the motion as an intentional 
action of a rational agent.   
 
It is important to note that the GoG model of intentional action allows for mistakes 
about the good.  Accordingly, although acting intentionally is necessarily always 
4""
acting for a perceived good, it is possible for one’s perceptions to be mistaken (p. 57).  
Thus, intentional actions are not conditioned on having an end that is genuinely good, 
yet they are conditioned on having an end that the actor believes is good.  Finally, 
intentional action under the GoG is, according to Rodriguez-Blanco, a kind of know-
how, that is a sort of ability – rather than intellectual process – to guide our actions 
towards a believed good. 
 
 3. Defending the doctrine of the guise of the good  
 
Prior to drawing on the doctrine of the GoG to tackle issues in legal philosophy, 
Rodriguez-Blanco sets out to defend the doctrine from recent critics, Michael Stocker 
and David Velleman among them (Stocker 1979, Velleman 2000, pp. 99-122).  These 
familiar challenges to the doctrine of the GoG take the form of counterexamples.  
Attempting to demonstrate instances of seemingly intentional actions that, 
nevertheless, do not appear to fall under the GoG, but rather seem either to fall under 
the ‘guise of the bad’ or as irrational yet intentional and deliberative actions.  Such 
counterexamples are designed to demonstrate that the GoG model – if taken as a 
complete theory of intentional actions – is overly constrictive.  Stocker’s examples 
include people harming others or themselves with the reason of inflicting harm or 
doing evil.  To this Velleman adds acting perversely or out of silliness, self-
destructiveness or despair.  As Velleman’s arguments suggest, in Rodriguez-Blanco’s 
and Anscombe’s world there are no truly evil people, as no one intentionally acts for 
bad ends.  At most there are well meaning or unreflective fools.  Even Satan himself, 
who proclaims ‘evil be thou my good,’ (Milton 1667, Book IV, line 110) at his worst, 
if he acts intentionally, aims to do good yet mistakes the good for the bad.     
   
While Rodriguez-Blanco’s responses to other criticisms of the doctrine of the GoG 
strike me as cogent, her response to the aforementioned examples of Stocker and 
Velleman, I think, falls short. Rodriguez-Blanco proposes deploying: 
 
…the why-question methodology to see whether in these cases the action is an 
intelligible and intentional action.  Let us suppose that I see you putting a 
needle in the skin of your enemy who is tied up and cannot move.  I ask you 
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‘why?’ and your answer is that it is for the sake of inflicting pain.  This is 
unintelligible. (p.57). 
 
Upon asserting the unintelligibility of this explanation, Rodriguez-Blanco proposes 
two alternative explanations of cases in which people genuinely think that they harm 
others for the sake of doing something bad.  One is that the person is not acting 
intentionally – that is not acting out of rational deliberation – but rather out of impulse 
or pure desire, neither of which is rational and, therefore, are not an intentional 
actions.  Rodriguez-Blanco’s second explanation is that the actor is essentially lying 
about his true reasons for actions.  That is, if his actions are intentional he must 
secretly believe that some good will come of them.   
 
Here Rodriguez-Blanco leaves me unconvinced. Her claim of ‘unintelligibility’ 
strikes me as far too strong and even implausible.  And her claims (p. 55) that 
Stocker’s examples involve diminished agency and, therefore, are not examples of 
intentional actions, are conclusive only in relation to some of the examples, not all.  
Better to simply bite the bullet and endorse the theory for its other descriptive virtues.  
The sting of  Stocker’s and Velleman’s examples is that they at least arguably look 
like genuinely deliberative and intentional actions in which one deliberately and 
intentionally does what one believes is a bad or irrational thing to do.  Rodriguez-
Blanco’s quoted response to what is essentially a counter-example argument is to 
deny that these examples involve conduct that is intelligible as intentional and 
deliberative actions and, therefore, are not good examples of practical reasoning under 
the guise of the bad or of irrational intentional conduct.  Here Rodriguez-Blanco is 
denying that these are examples of intentional and deliberative actions because – 
following the ‘why?’ methodology – they involve actions that are not grounded in a 
valuable end or good-making reason.  What she is essentially doing is to rule out 
counterexamples to the claim that all intentional actions are under the GoG on the 
grounds that the examples do not cohere with the GoG model.  
   
Rodriguez-Blanco’s unwavering commitment to the doctrine of the GoG is both the 
book’s strength and its limitation.  On the one hand, the doctrine of the GoG provides 
a powerful clear vector around which Rodriguez-Blanco can rearrange and explain a 
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whole variety of questions regarding the law and our practical life.  Moreover, her 
book makes a compelling case for better incorporation of the insights of action theory 
into legal philosophy.  On the other hand, those more skeptical or less solidly on 
board with the doctrine of the GoG or with Rodriguez-Blanco’s version of it as a good 
or complete account of intentional action may find it more difficult at times to follow 
Rodriguez-Blanco on her sometimes revisionist path.  
 
 4. How law is normative  
 
The two towering figures of twentieth century legal philosophy, H.L.A. Hart and 
Hans Kelsen, have provided the most influential accounts of the normativity of law.  
Rodriguez-Blanco aims to rethink both accounts in light of the doctrine of the GoG, 
with implications for how we should understand the normativity of law under both 
theories.  Her methodology is to examine the normativity of law by looking to the 
practical reasoning involved in complying with the law, thereby subsuming the 
normativity of law to the doctrine of the GoG.  For reasons of brevity I will focus 
only on her discussion of Hart.    
 
Hart’s account of the normativity of law is predicated on his idea of the ‘internal point 
of view’ (Hart 1961).  Hart explains law’s normativity as a feature of people’s 
acceptance of the law as reason-giving.  We detect this acceptance of the law’s 
normativity when exploring people’s law-abiding behavior from their own internal 
point of view.  That is, cases in which people follow the law not for some prudential 
or instrumental reason but because they think that the law itself is reason to follow it.  
For example, think of how law followers invoke the law to justify their behavior or to 
criticize those behaving unlawfully.  In other words, the law’s normativity is a feature 
of people endowing the law with normativity and behaving out of acceptance of the 
law as a source for reasons.  Were we to ask someone who accepts the normativity of 
the law why, for example, she avoids parking in the park, her answer would be that 
there is a law to that effect and that people should follow the law.  Full stop.  For Hart 
the explanation of the practical reasoning involved in following the law comes, 
therefore, to a satisfying end with the acceptance of the law’s normativity.  Notice 
that Hart is not explaining here the legitimacy of the law or its morality.  Rather, he is 
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explaining the law’s social normativity from the point of view of those who view the 
law as normative.  For Hart, therefore, the normativity of law is a feature of social, 
behavioral and psychological facts.  
Rodriguez-Blanco believes Hart’s explanation of law’s normativity is incomplete (pp. 
86-94).  For her, intentionally and deliberately following the law and accepting its 
authority is a form of intentional action, as opposed to an impulse or compulsion and, 
therefore, is necessarily performed under the GoG.  For Rodriguez-Blanco, therefore, 
following the law out of acceptance of the law’s normativity is an intentional action 
much the same as making tea.  In fact, she contends that Hart himself also assumed or 
took following the law as a form of intentional acting.  Accordingly, were one’s 
response to the question ‘why do you follow the law?’ merely ‘because it’s the law’ 
or ‘because I accept the law’s authority’, then one’s intentional following of the law 
would only be partially intelligible.   
 
Under the doctrine of the GoG intentionally following the law is only intelligible if 
one’s following of the law is grounded in a reason that one believes makes following 
the law good.  Without such a reason one’s following the law lacks – from one’s own 
point of view – grounding in a good-making reason and is, therefore, not a product of 
intentional and deliberative action.  From the point of view of the intentional rule-
follower the rational chain of justifications for her actions cannot stop with the rule 
itself, because the rule itself is not, according to Rodriguez-Blanco, a good-making 
reason.  Therefore, Hart’s position that the normativity of law is a function of an 
acceptance of the law – i.e., of intentional compliance with the law from the internal 
point of view – is parasitic on the doctrine of the GoG.  
 
Moreover, Rodriguez-Blanco contends that pursuing Anscombe’s ‘why?’ style of 
questioning people who follow the law out of acceptance of its normativity in fact 
leads to concluding that they believe that following the law has good-making features, 
such as fairness, benefiting society or contributing to social coordination.  And 
without this final link in the chain of one’s explanations for why one follows the law 
we cannot really know whether one in fact accepts the law as normative.     
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The core implication of Rodriguez-Blanco’s claim is the coupling of endorsement 
with acceptance.  That is, Rodriguez-Blanco aims to demonstrate that following the 
law out of acceptance of its normativity necessarily also involves an endorsement of 
the law’s legitimacy, or at least that there is something good in following the law.  
Accordingly, if Hart’s acceptance theory of the normativity of law is correct, then it 
follows that the normativity of law is parasitic on an endorsement of the law.  
 
Doubts do, however, arise.  Generally, reading Rodriguez-Blanco one gets the feeling 
at times that the phenomenon of compliance with the law is put in the straight-jacket 
of a rather strict account of practical rationality.  One wonders whether people who 
follow the law ‘because it’s the law’ would really always respond to Anscombe’s 
‘why?’ questioning in the way Rodriguez-Blanco predicts.  That is, with an 
endorsement – manifested in their actions – of the goodness of their lawful behavior – 
social coordination, fairness, preserving the peace and the goodness of being law-
abiding are some of the responses Rodriguez-Blanco imagines (pp. 90, 92).  I am 
more doubtful.  It seems to me that people often just accept the law as binding and go 
about their business following it.  Full stop.  That is, acceptance of the law is not 
always coupled with its endorsement.  At times, we follow the law without much 
regard to its legitimacy or to the good of following it.  Yet in many such cases we still 
seem to be acting intentionally and for what we take as a reason – the law. 
 
 5. The nature of law’s normativity  
 
The leading contemporary account of the nature of legal norms is that of Joseph Raz, 
who views law as providing ‘protected reasons’ for actions (Raz 1979, p. 18).  That is, 
the law gives us reason to do as the law requires as well as reason to exclude from 
our deliberations other reasons for or against doing as the law requires.  This 
‘exclusionary’ quality of law is, according to Raz, the key feature of the normative 
structure of authority in general and of law in particular as a type of practical 
authority (Raz 1990, pp. 73-84).  Moreover, Raz’s position is that law claims to have 
legitimate authority (Raz 1985, p. 295).  Relatedly, a practical authority – such as the 
law – is legitimate, according to Raz if and only if the following applies: were one to 
follow the authority’s directives one would be more likely to comply with the reasons 
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that apply to one (regardless of the authority) than one would be were one to attempt 
to comply with those reasons based on one’s own practical reasoning.  This is known 
as the ‘service conception’ of authority (Raz 1986, ch. 3).  The idea is that the law, 
when legitimate, functions to mediate between citizens and the complex reasons that 
apply to them, reasons they are unlikely to succeed in complying with more fully if 
left to their own devices.  Accordingly, the whole point of law is that it provides us 
with a way to comply with the reasons we already have, so long as we obey the law as 
an authority, that is follow the law because it’s the law and not out of an evaluation of 
the law’s content.   
 
Rodriguez-Blanco claims that Raz’s picture of the law’s normativity in terms of an 
authority does not cohere with the view of law under the GoG.  As we saw, for 
Rodriguez-Blanco the normativity of the law – as engaged with by those who accept 
the law’s normativity from the internal point of view – incorporates not only 
acceptance of the law’s normativity but also an endorsement of its goodness.  In other 
words, when we intentionally follow the law we do as the law requires not because 
the law requires it but rather because we believe that what the law requires also 
happens to be a good thing to do.  When guided by the law we do not, therefore, act 
on the law’s authority – at least not always.   Accordingly, Rodriguez-Blanco’s point 
is that considering that it does not cohere with the process of practical reasoning 
typically involved in complying with the law, Raz’s authority-based account of the 
nature of law’s normativity is mistaken.  
 
Contrary to Rodriguez-Blanco, I am unsure that the authoritative conception of law is 
incompatible with the doctrine of the GoG.  Let’s concede that when we intentionally 
act on authority we do so because we accept the law’s claim to legitimacy or, at least, 
view acting on the law’s authority to be good somehow.  In doing so, however, we 
need not accept the content of the law’s directives as good.  It strikes me as enough 
that one takes following the law as an authority as good, in order to satisfy the 
doctrine of the GoG.  In other words, Raz’s theory seems to me compatible with at 
least a lean version of the doctrine of the GoG.  
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Another point Rodriguez-Blanco gives to deny the authority-based account of law is 
that rule following requires interpretation (she does not use these terms), and 
interpretation requires reflection on the rule’s grounding reasons (pp. 156-157).  Rules 
are often vague, under-determinative and never sufficiently detailed to cover all 
contingences that may arise when attempting to follow them.  Accordingly, we are 
often called upon to interpret the rule that we are trying to follow.  And interpretation 
often requires thinking about what the rule is for, using the rule’s aims or ‘intentions’ 
to fill in the gaps.  From this Rodriguez-Blanco deduces that we often do not follow 
the law as an authority – doing as the law requires because the law requires it – but 
rather follow the law under the GoG – for the end, value, intention or reason that we 
ascribe to the law. 
 
Here too I do not agree with Rodriguez-Blanco.  It is true that in order to follow the 
law as an authority we must have a sense of what the law is.  And to determine what 
the law is we often must turn to interpretation.  It is also true that when interpreting 
we often turn to the law’s ends or ‘intentions’.  But from this it does not follow that 
we endorse the ends or intentions that we, as interpreters, ascribe to the law.  The 
doctrine of the GoG is satisfied so long as we endorse the law’s authority.  In such 
cases we use the law’s ends and intentions as means for complying with the demands 
of the law, not as independent reasons for action.  
 
6. Rodriguez-Blanco’s theory of law’s normativity 
 
Rodriguez-Blanco offers her own original account of the nature of the law’s 
normativity, conceived under the GoG (Ch. 8).  She holds that when people follow the 
law intentionally (i.e., under the GoG) they presume that the law is a legitimate 
authority and/or believe that the actions required by the law are good (regardless of 
the law’s demands).  For Rodriguez-Blanco these two cases expose the nature of the 
law’s normativity.  Because in these cases those following the law for what they 
believe is a good-making reason find that reason in the law itself.  How does law give 
us these reasons?  According to Rodriguez-Blanco the law claims legitimate authority 
and adheres to the principles of the rule of law, which according to her give us 
reasons to assume the law is legitimate (Ch. 7, pp. 160-169).  Moreover, the law 
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provides knowledge of reasons independent of the law that count in favor of the law’s 
content (pp. 152-166). 
 
Rodriguez-Blanco gives an example of a law requiring dumping waste at a designated 
location as part of a policy of eliminating river pollution (pp. 163-165).  She imagines 
a farmer loading his truck with waste.  When asked ‘why are you complying with the 
law?’, the farmer responds in one or both of the following ways: he may (i) endorse 
the reasons that ground the legal rules, that is accept that preventing river pollution is 
of value and that what the law requires furthers that value; and/or, (ii) accept the 
goodness of the law as an authority, saying something like ‘I follow the law 
‘[b]ecause legal authorities are a good sort of thing, i.e., they correctly and 
legitimately organize these affairs…’ or ‘… I follow the law because it is good that 
we have an organized and coordinated society.’ ‘ (p. 164).  Notice, therefore, that 
Rodriguez-Blanco does not appear to think that we can intentionally accept law’s 
authority based on its goodness as such (as was my defense of Raz), but rather we do 
so for more particular good-making features in law’s authority.  
 
It is when the farmer responds in one of these two ways that he is complying with the 
law intentionally (i.e., under the GoG).  That is, he is acting intentionally for what he 
believes are good-making reasons that he finds in the law.  Accordingly, these 
answers expose the normative nature of law as it is manifested in the practical 
reasoning of those who follow the law’s guidance: the law provides reasons to assume 
its legitimacy as well as points to independent reasons in favor of what the law 
requires.  
 
I have a couple of issues with Rodriguez-Blanco’s view.  First, I doubt whether it can 
account for many systems of government we would recognize as legal.  Many legal 
systems do not sufficiently adhere to the principles of the rule of law to ground a 
presumption of the law’s legitimacy.  Moreover, not all law is predicated on even 
apparent good-making reasons.  Many laws and even legal systems are patently stupid 
or immoral or at least not obviously well-grounded.  Other laws are entirely opaque, 
certainly to laypersons, providing no reasons in favor of their content.   And still, they 
are all laws and legal systems with people seemingly intentionally following them out 
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of acceptance of their normativity.  Rodriguez-Blanco’s novel theory of the law’s 
normativity strikes me as too narrow to capture the full phenomenon of legal 
normativity.   
 
Second, unlike my attempt to bring Raz’s theory of law under the GoG, Rodriguez-
Blanco’s description of how people come to accept or assume the goodness of the 
law’s authority strikes me as overly saturated with (practical) reasoning and 
somewhat out of touch with how most people follow the law’s authority most of the 
time.  I doubt, for example, whether there are many farmers and lorry drivers who 
would regularly explain their following of the law’s authority on grounds of social 
coordination or the overall legitimacy of the legal system.  As if such reasons are part 
of their know-how of law following.  Rodriguez-Blanco’s account of law following 
excludes, therefore, much of what seems to me genuine intentional law-compliant 
behavior, and, therefore, does not capture the full spectrum of legal normativity.  
Sometimes we accept an authority in ways that appear intentional although when 
asked to report on the authority’s goodness we are at a loss.  I am reminded here of a 
scene from Woody Allen’s Hannah and Her Sisters, where Allen’s character tells his 
incredulous parents about his plans to abandon Judaism:   
 
Woody: But if there’s a God, then why is there so much evil in the world?  
Just on a simplistic level.  Why-why were there Nazis?                            
Woody’s Mother (offscreen in the bathroom): Tell him, Max. 
Max (Woody’s father): How the hell do I know why there were Nazis? I don’t 
know how the can opener works. 
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